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(Respondent's Brief, page 5)
2.

Defendant asserts that the statutor*-

Senate Bi 11 9] governs, to wit:

anguaa*

When a covered person claims an uninsured motor
vehicle under subsection (2)(b) (an unidentified
motor vehicle which left the scene of an accident proximately caused by its operator) proximately caused an accident without touching the
covered person or the vehicle occupied by the
covered person, then the covered person shall
show the existence of the other motor vehicle by
clear and convincing evidence, which shall consist of more than the covered person's testimony.
A correct reading of the record herein indicates that
Senate Bill 91 cited by Defendant is not controlling in this
case nor does it render this appeal moot for the following reasons:
I.

ALL REFERENCES TO THE LANGUAGE OF ANY STATUTE NOT IN

EFFECT ON THE DATE OF THE INJURY SHOULD BE STRICKEN FROM THE
RECORD AND NOT CONSIDERED.
Lisa Marakis, the Plaintiff below, was injured on September
4, 1982.

At the time of said injury, the uninsured motorist sta-

tute in Utah, which is analyzed thoroughly in Plaintiff's brief,
did not require that a claim such as Plaintiff's be corrroborated
by evidence other than Plaintiff's testimony, nor did it require
that physical contact be evidenced before an uninsured motorists
claim could be paid.
The statute cited by Defendant as Senate Bill 91 is not
now the law of this state and does not become such until July 1,
1986.

Hor does the prospective statute cited by Defendant con-

tain any clause which makes it retroactive or which purports that
it is a "clarification" of any prior legislative intent.

Indeed,

the 1986 legislature is not vested with the power to determine
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what the legislative intent of a prior legislature was or should
have been.
Therefore, Defendant's reliance in April of 1986 upon a
statute which will not become law for three more months is illfounded, irrelevant and should be stricken from the record and
excluded from consideration herein,
II.

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE RECORD IN THIS CASE DOES NOT

PRECLUDE PLAINTIFF FROM RECOVERY UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SENATE
BILL 91.
The focus of that portion of Senate Bill 91 upon which
Defendant relies is not physical contact but the credibility of
the insured.

The new law, when it goes into effect, will require

the insured to convince the court that there was, indeed, another
car which caused the injury.
In the instant case, in its original Ruling on Motion for
Summary Judgment dated April 30, 1985, the trial court wrote
"Based upon the affidavit submitted by Plaintiff/ the court finds
that there is no disputed issue of material fact in this case."
The court then ruled as a matter of law that "the provisions in
Defendant's insurance policy requiring physical contact before
the insurance claim is viable as to an uninsured motorist accident, is void and unenforceable and against public policy."
Defendant then moved to set the summary judgment aside.
In doing so, it presented to the trial court no affidavits disputing the material facts presented in Plaintiff's affidavit.
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Defendant's focus was on, rather, a legal argument that physical
contact was required.
In reconsidering its original summary judgment in its
ruling dated July 11, 1985, the trial court indicated on page 2
of its ruling that it relied on Plaintiff's answers to request
for admissions, answer to interrogatories and memorandum, which
included her affidavit.

At no time did the trial court ever

assert that it did not believe another vehicle was involved.
In its July 11, 1985 ruling the trial court, having thus
found that the facts as asserted under oath by Plaintiff were undisputed, found that in all cases physical contact was required.
It is evident that the issue before the trial court was
never whether Plaintiff's assertions were corroborated.

Indeed,

the trial court found that the facts asserted by Plaintiff were
undisputed.

That finding is not appealed from and must be

relied upon by the appellate court in deciding this case.
The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in
finding that physical contact was required in all cases, even
in cases where the parties did not dispute the existence of a
second vehicle.
Even if this court applies the criteria set forth in
Senate Bill 91 to this case, the trial court erred.

The law

effective July 1, 1986, upon which Defendant relies, does not
require physical contact in every case, as the ruling of the
trial court herein would.
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Under the state of the law at the present time and at the
time the summary judgment was entered herein, Plaintiff had, to
the trial courtfs satisfaction, met the burden of proof relative
to the facts of the accident.

Therefore Plaintiff is entitled

to recover and the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Defendant.
DATED this /*> day of

d ^ ^ ' ,

1986

WAYN^jr. WATSON, P.C.
Attorney for Piantiff-Appellant
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